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ARGUMENT
J.

HARRINGTONS ' STATEMENT OF FACTS MISCHARACTERIZES TWO CRITICAL POINTS.

Two of the "facts" cited by the Harringtons as "undisputed" are not facts at all, but
legal arguments. The Harringtons' "Fact" No. 13 asserts that "[t]he February 18 Letter
Agreement and the checks provided by Mrs. Peterson are the only written documents relating
to an agreement of the parties in February 1993 for Peterson to advance additional monies."
(Brief of Appellees at 7, f 13 (emphasis added).) Mrs. Peterson, of course, objects to the
Harringtons' use of the term "relating." Whether the Peterson Trust Deed and the December
1992 Agreement "relate" to the February 1993 Agreement is one of the main issues before
the Court; the Harringtons cannot simply declare them unrelated as an "undisputed fact."
Moreover, the February 18 letter cannot properly be called a "letter agreement" since it is not
one—it is merely a unilateral statement by Mr. Harrington, prepared without either
participation by or request from Mrs. Peterson.
In the same vein, the Harringtons' "Fact" No. 15 declares that "[t]here was no
promissory note reflecting the $69,626.84l loaned pursuant to the February 18 Letter
Agreement, nor is there any document reciting that the monies loaned pursuant to that letter
agreement are secured by the [Peterson Trust Deed]." (Brief of Appellees at 7, f 15.) Once
again, the Harringtons seem to expect the Court to accept as "facts" conclusions favorable
to themselves on the very points at issue: whether a promissory note exists reflecting the
1993 advances, and whether these advances are secured by the Peterson Trust Deed. The

*The actual amount advanced was $70,076.44. (Record at 831, f 24.)
1

1993 advances, in addition, were not "loaned pursuant to the February 18 Letter Agreement";
they were made pursuant to Mr. Harrington's February 1993 request. The February 18 letter
was not the agreement—nor is it even an accurate memorialization of the oral
agreement—under which the 1993 advances were made.
Z7.

THE 1993 ADVANCES WERE SECURED BY THE PURCHASE MONEY TRUST DEED.

The Peterson Trust Deed explicitly secures four categories of later transactions:
(1) payment of the indebtedness evidenced by a promissory note of even date
hereof in the principal sum of $95,000, made by Trustor, payable to the order
of Beneficiary at the time, in the manner and with interest as therein set forth,
and any extension and/or renewals or modifications thereof;
(2) the performance of each agreement of Trustor herein contained;
(3) the payment of such additional loans or advances as hereafter may be
made to Trustor, or his successors or assigns, when evidenced by a promissory
note or notes reciting that they are secured by this Deed of Trust; and
(4) the payment of all sums expended or advanced by Beneficiary under or
pursuant to the terms hereof, together with interest thereon as herein provided.
(Record at 193.) The Harringtons argue mainly that clause 3 (above) governs the 1993
advances, totaling $70,076.44, to which Mrs. Peterson agreed in February 1993; and that
these advances were not evidenced by a promissory note reciting that they were secured by
the original deed of trust, and were therefore not secured, they conclude, by the original deed
of trust. The Harringtons are mistaken.
A.

The 1993 Advances Are Evidenced by a Promissory Note Secured by the June 1991
Peterson Trust Deed.
Whether clause 3 (above) does govern the 1993 advances is in reality a moot point:

even assuming, arguendo, that it might, the later advances were quite clearly covered by a
2

completely satisfactory promissory note secured by the June 1991 Peterson Trust Deed.
1.

The Letter of February 1993 Constitutes a Promissory Note.

The Harringtons declare that the "the February 18 Letter Agreement.2. . . contains no
promise to pay by HPI or Harrington" (Brief of Appellees at 21-22). Actually, of course,
Mr. Harrington's letter expressly assures Mrs. Peterson that "any money advanced by you
. . . will be returned to you with interest. . . prior to the distribution of any proceeds to
Harrington Properties, Inc." (Record at 454 (emphasis added).) A promise to pay does not
become any less a promise by being cast into the passive voice, nor does the fact that this
particular promissory note may be nonnegotiable for lack of sum certain and specific date
render it any less enforceable. See DeBry v. Cascade Enterprises. 879 P.2d 1353,1357 (Utah
1994) ("Because the payment of the note was subject to conditions, it is not a negotiable
instrument. Rather, the note is simply a promise by the DeBrys to pay . . . upon the
defendants' compliance with the conditions."); First Investment Co. v. Andersen. 621 P.2d
683, 686 (Utah 1980) ("The mere promise to pay, absent the magic words 'payable to order
or to bearer' renders the note nonnegotiable, and the liability is determined as a matter of
simple contract law.")
Mr. Harrington promised to pay "any money advanced" by Mrs. Peterson "above and

2

The word "agreement" inaccurately represents the purpose and nature of the February
18, 1993, letter. It was in fact a purely unilateral declaration by Mr. Harrington. The letter
itself is not an "agreement" somehow enforceable against Mrs. Peterson, as the Harringtons
evidently believe it to be. Nor is it by any stretch of the imagination an integration of the
agreement made in February of 1993 concerning Mrs. Peterson's advance of the sums
necessary to complete Mr. Harrington's spec home.
3

beyond the $75,000.00" negotiated in the December 1992 Agreement. Mrs. Peterson, in the
ensuing months after February 1993, advanced a total of $70,076.44 in new funds, for which
Mr. Harrington is now liable under the February 18, 1993, promissory note.3 As explained
below, this Note was secured—directly and indirectly—by the 1991 Peterson Trust Deed.
2.

Mr. Harrington's February Letter Memorializes a Modification to the
December 1992 Agreement.

Despite the Harringtons' contention that "[n]o such alteration, adjustment, or change
ever occurred to the Peterson Note or [the Peterson Trust Deed]" (Brief of Appellees at 15),
the 1993 advances were clearly made pursuant to a modification of the earlier December
1992 Agreement (itself an "addition" to the original financing provided by Mrs. Peterson)
extending the amount to be loaned thereunder "above and beyond the $75,000.00" originally
contemplated thereby (Record at 454).4 Thus, the fact that the 1993 advances are secured by
the Peterson Trust Deed is easily deduced from an examination of the various documents
memorializing the several related agreements between the Harringtons and Mrs. Peterson.

3

The proceeds of sale of the Sunset Oaks Property were of course insufficient to cover
the 1993 advances. At present, Mrs. Petersons's net loss, on this point only, of principal plus
interest approaches $100,000.00.
^ h e Harringtons may argue here that the December 8,1992, Agreement provides that
it "may not be amended or modified except by an instrument in writing signed by each of the
parties." (Record at 451, f 10.) It is, however, a well-recognized rule of law that "parties
to a written contract may modify, waive, or make new terms notwithstanding terms in the
contract designed to hamper such freedom." Prince v. R.C. Tolman Constr. Co.. 610 P.2d
1267, 1269 (Utah 1980) (citing Davis v. Pavne and Day. Inc.. 10 Utah 2d 53, 348 P.2d 337
(I960)): "notwithstanding recitals in a prior contract restricting changes or modification in
its terms, the parties are as free in appropriate circumstances to renegotiate new terms or to
make separate supplemental agreements as they were to make the contract in the first place."
Id (citing Cheney v. Rucker. 14 Utah 2d 205, 381 P.2d 86 (1963)).
4

The December 8, 1992, Agreement recites, inter alia, that Mr. Harrington executed
a Trust Deed Note for $95,000.00 on June 21,1991, payable to Mrs. Peterson, secured by the
Peterson Trust Deed; that "[additional funds are needed to complete the construction of the
improvements on the Property"; and that "Peterson is willing to advance additional funds to
be used for that purpose . . . ." (Record at 975,fflfA, D, & E.) The moneys advanced by
Mrs. Peterson under the December 1992 Agreement, in other words, were in addition to the
$95,000.00 she had previously provided in June of 1991 by agreeing to seller financing.
Accordingly, the $75,000.00 advanced under the December 1992 Agreement were expressly
"secured by [the] Trust Deed dated June 21,1991 . . . . " (Record at 977, f 8.)5 This language
alone demonstrates that both parties considered the December 1992 commitment not merely
a related transaction, but an extension or modification of the original $95,000.00 financing.
In February of 1993, Mr. Harrington approached Mrs. Peterson for yet another
"advance [of] additional monies to complete construction" (Record at 419, f 27), which Mr.
Harrington has characterized as a "continuation of] her funding of the final construction that
had started in December 1992." (Id.) The 1993 advances are merely an extension or
modification of the December 1992 Agreement—an agreement which quite clearly recites
that it is secured by the Peterson Trust Deed—and are therefore a further extension or

5

As a related future advance, the $75,000.00 would have been secured under one or
more of clauses 1, 2, and 4 of the Peterson Trust Deed's dragnet provision. See infra at pp.
14-20. Counsel for Mrs. Peterson, however, included this clarifying statement referring to
the 1991 Trust Deed as "assurance double sure" and not, as the Harringtons would have it,
as some sort of admission that only clause 3 governs future advances. Moreover, there is
nothing in the law which forbids the securitization of a future advance, related or not, under
an earlier agreement.
5

modification of the 1991 and 1992 Peterson Financings. The 1993 advances, then, are
secured by the December 1992 Agreement, of which by extension they are a part, and which
is itself an extension or modification of the 1991 Peterson Note. This clearly brings the later
Peterson advances under clause 1 of the Trust Deed dragnet provision, which secures "any
extensions and/or renewals or modifications" of the Peterson Note.
B.

The "Plain Language" of Clause 3 of the Trust Deed Excludes the 1993 Advances.
A "dragnet" clause is a "provision in a mortgage in which a mortgagor gives security

for past and future advances as well as present indebtedness." Mead Corp. v. Dixon Paper
Co., 907 P.2d 1179,1181 n.l (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (quoting Blacks Law Dictionary 494 (6th
ed. 1990)).

In Mead Corp.. this Court upheld as a valid dragnet clause a contractual

provision stating that the collateral involved secured "all Debtor's present and future debts,
obligations and liabilities of whatever nature to Bank." 907 P.2d at 1182. The four clauses
of the Peterson Deed's securitization provision (quoted at p. 2 above) likewise secure present
and future advances.
Under Utah law, however, as Mrs. Peterson has already pointed out (Appellants' Brief
at 18), a dragnet clause "will not be extended to cover future advances unless the advances
are of the same kind and quality or relate to the same transaction or series of transactions as
the principal obligation secured or unless the document evidencing the subsequent advance
refers to the [security agreement] as providing security therefor." Heath Tecna Corp. v.
Zions First Nat'l Bank. 609 P.2d 1334, 1337 (Utah 1980) (emphasis added) (citing First
Security Bank v. Shiew. 609 P.2d 952, 954 (Utah 1980)); accord Bank of Kansas v. Nelson

6

Music Company. Inc.. 949 F.2d 321, 324 (10th Cir. 1991) (citing Ram Co. v. Estate of
Kobbeman. 696 P.2d 936,942 (Kan. 1985)) (Summarizing the factors "motivating} Kansas'
policy disfavoring dragnet clauses," including "application of the dragnet clause to unrelated,
dissimilar, and often distant obligations

"); First Nat'l Bankr Cortez. Colorado v. First

Interstate Bank. Riverton. Wyoming, 774 P.2d 645, 655 (Wyoming 1989); Nat'l Bank of
Waterloo v. Moeller. 434 N.W.2d 887, 891 (Iowa 1989).
Utah case law, in other words, provides two paths by which future advances may be
secured under a dragnet clause: first, the future advances may be "of the same kind and
quality or relate to the same transaction or series of transactions" as did the original
obligation, or second, documentation of the subsequent advance may refer to the original
obligation as security. Thus, for a future advance to be covered by a dragnet clause—like
clauses 1 through 4 of the securitization provision in the trust deed at issue in the present
dispute—the future advance must be related to the original transaction, or, if unrelated, there
must be a writing referencing the original as security therefor.
The Harringtons attack this position by arguing that First Security Bank v. Shiew. 609
P.2d 952 (Utah 1980) (upon which, among other cases, Mrs. Peterson relied in her opening
brief), "in no way suggests that if a loan is related to a prior loan, it is secured despite
specific language in the trust deed to the contrary." (Brief of Appellees at 13.) No "specific
language . . . to the contrary," however, appears anywhere in the trust deed. Clause 3
provides only that it secures "additional loans or advances . . . when evidenced by a
promissory note or notes reciting that they are secured by this Deed of Trust" (Record at

7

193)—it says nothing at all about relatedness or unrelatedness. But since the case law reads
into all dragnet clauses a provision securing any related future advance (i.e., related future
advances would be considered secured by any general dragnet clause by operation of law
regardless of whether a later writing referencing the original agreement existed or not), the
only transactions upon which clause 3 can have any effect are unrelated future advances, for
which such an express reference back would be necessary in order to secure them under the
original agreement.
The logic is inescapable: clause 3 can govern only unrelated future transactions. To
related future advances, it is irrelevant: Utah case law imposes security whenever a general
dragnet clause is followed by a later related advance of funds. The application of Utah case
law, and the resulting inference that clause 3fs written reference requirement applies only to
unrelated future advances, contrary to the Harringtons' argument, is not an impermissible
amendment of clause 3 {see Brief of Appellees at 12); it is merely the obvious conclusion to
be drawn from a set of ironclad premises.
C.

The 1993 Advances Are Related Future Advances, and Are Therefore Secured by
the Peterson Trust Deed.
The multipart dragnet clause in the Peterson Trust Deed can thus be seen to cover

present and future advances, both those related to the original transaction—the purchase of
the Sunset Oaks property for the purpose of building a house for resale—under the provisions
of clauses 1, 2, and 4, as well as other later advances unrelated thereto, if in conformance
with clause 3's writing requirement.
The Harringtons, however, next argue that the $70,076.44 1993 advances were
8

completely unrelated to the original transaction secured by the Peterson Trust Deed, and that
clause 3 must therefore govern the advance anyway, even if, as Mrs. Peterson has shown,
clause 3 covers only unrelated future advances. "Even if defendants' argument were
correct," the Harringtons contend, "the 1993 advances relate to the construction loan
(Guardian State Bank) and not to the Peterson Note for the purchase of the undeveloped lot"
(Brief of Appellees at 12 n.7). This argument is an unwarranted (and unconvincing) isolation
of the 1993 advances from the earlier financings with which they were bound up.
That the 1993 advances were related to the original $95,000.00 financing can be easily
demonstrated by the application of either of the two tests which have evolved for determining
the intent of the parties to agreements containing dragnet clauses. Under the "relationship
of the loans" standard, "if there be little or no connection between the loans or the loans be
so different in nature, an inference can be drawn that the parties did not intend the second
loan to fall under the security of the first loan." Shiew. 609 P.2d at 957 (citing Union Bank
v. Wendland. 126 Cal. Rptr. 549, 557 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976)). The "reliance on the security"
test, on the other hand, focuses its inquiry on "whether the second loan was made in reliance
on the original security." I d
L

The Relationship of the Loans Test

In Mead. 907 P.2d 1179, West One Bank extended two kinds of financing on the same
day to a company referred to as Graphics. One was a $50,000.00 revolving credit line. The
other was a $100,000.00 loan. Both were secured by a $100,000 letter of credit from Wells
Fargo. The credit line was also secured by Graphics' accounts receivable and inventory. The

9

security agreement executed in connection with the line of credit contained a dragnet clause,
stating that the collateral "secure[d] all of Debtor's present and future debts, obligations and
liabilities of whatever nature to the bank . . . including loans made pursuant to this
Agreement and the Debtor's obligations hereunder." Graphics later sought additional
financing from the Mead Corporation, which extended credit to Graphics also secured by
Graphics' inventory and accounts receivable.
Graphics defaulted, and West One drew on the Wells Fargo letter of credit. A Mr.
Johnson, who was related to a principal of Graphics, reimbursed Wells Fargo and West One
assigned its interest in the $50,000 credit line note and security agreement to Johnson. Mead
filed suit to determine the parties' priority in regard to the inventory and accounts receivable.
The trial court granted summary judgment to Johnson, ruling that he had first priority. On
appeal, Mead argued that the dragnet clause was limited to the $50,000 credit line, and was
not intended to apply to the $ 100,000 note—that is, that the inventory and accounts could not
be considered collateral for the $100,000 loan—and that Johnson was not entitled to
subrogation as to the collateral.
This Court disagreed with Mead's first argument, pointing to the language of the
various agreements, and adding that "[t]he fact that both transactions were completed on the
same day by the same parties strongly suggests they were related transactions." 907 P.2d at
1182. The Court therefore held that the dragnet clause had validly bestowed upon West One
an interest in the collateral which secured the $100,000 loan—including Graphics' inventory
and accounts—but reversed the trial court on the ground that Johnson was not entitled to

10

equitable subrogation because of the unique character of letters of credit.
The relatedness issue in the present dispute recalls that which was presented in Mead.
From 1980 until 1991, Mr. Harrington built six homes for resale in Summit and Salt Lake
Counties. (Record at 409, f 3.) Hearing of the Sunset Oaks property, Mr. Harrington
contacted Mrs. Peterson and, in his own words, "expressed interest in purchasing the . . .
property from her for the purpose of building a home on the property for resale." (Id,ffl[4
& 5.) Harrington's goal was the construction of the house on the Sunset Oaks lot; purchasing
the Peterson property was simply a means to that end. Harrington did not purchase the land
as a nature preserve and then later on formulate a plan to build a house there; he entered the
transaction with the express intent to construct and sell a house. He specifically negotiated
the subordination of the Peterson Trust Deed to the Guardian State Bank construction loan,
both of which were concluded as part of the same closing on June 21,1991. Since those two
were clearly tied to the same purpose, it follows that the later construction financing from
Mrs. Peterson also related to the same objective as the 1991 financing.
Under the "relationship of the loans" standard, "if there be little or no connection
between the loans or the loans be so different in nature, an inference can be drawn that the
parties did not intend the second loan to fall under the security of the first loan." Shiew. 609
P.2d at 957 (citing Union Bank v. Wendland, 126 Cal. Rptr. 549, 557 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976)).
Here, however, far from being able to show "little or no connection" between the 1991
financing and the '92 and '93 advances, one is hard-pressed to distinguish the ultimate
purpose of one from the others. Mr. Harrington's stated purpose in entering into the 1991

11

agreement was to "purchas[e] the Sunset Oaks Property . . . for the purpose of building a
home on the Property for resale." (Record at 409, f 5.) His request for "additional monies"
from Mrs. Peterson in February 1993 was "for the purpose of construction of the home
located at 1656 S. Sunset Oaks Dr[ive]." (Record at 454.) The purpose of the three
financings was identical; one cannot seriously argue that they are disparate, unrelated
transactions.
2.

The Reliance on the Security Test

The focus of the "reliance on the security" test is "whether the second loan was made
in reliance on the original security

when a different security is taken for the second loan

an intent cannot be inferred that parties relied on the security for the first loan." Shiew. 609
P.2d at 957 (citing Wendland. 126 Cal. Rptr. at 557); see also Pearll v. Williams. 704 P.2d
1348,1352 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985). Applying the reliance on the security test, the Pearll court
concluded that the future advance there at issue was secured by an earlier mortgage on the
grounds, among others, that "nothing in the . . . promissory note . .. indicates that different
security would be used or . . . . that the second note would be unsecured." 704 P.2d at 1352.
Similarly, in the present dispute, Mr. Harrington's unilateral February 18,1993, letter
recites no other security, and twice references the December 8, 1992, Agreement—the terms
of which Mrs. Peterson believed Mr. Harrington had agreed would govern the 1993
advances, as she stated in her supplemental affidavit:
When, in February of 1993, I agreed at the request of Mr. Harrington to
advance certain additional funds, I did not ask Mr. Harrington to memorialize
our understanding with any letter. His letter of February 18, 1993 was
prepared and sent by him unilaterally. That letter does not completely describe
12

what we then agreed to. The new advances contemplated pursuant to my
February 1993 discussions with Mr. Harrington were to be made under all of
the same terms as set forth in the December 8, 1992 Agreement. I recall that
Mr. Harrington and I verbally agreed that such advances were to be treated
exactly the same as the prior advances made under the December 8, 1992
Agreement. If I had been made aware or otherwise believed that those new
1993 advances would not be secured by the Sunset Oaks property, I would not
have agreed to make those new advances, nor would I have made them. When
I received the February 18,1993 letter, I only quickly looked at it, and did not
respond to it, believing that the new advances would be treated the same as
under the December 8, 1992 written Agreement.
(Record at 830-31, f 23.) Mrs. Peterson relied expressly upon these oral assurances by Mr.
Harrington when she agreed in February 1993 to make more advances.
The Harringtons' respond that "there is no mention of any such agreement or
understanding" in Mr. Harrington's unilateral letter of February 18,1993 (Brief of Appellees
at 19). This proves nothing, however, since the letter did not affirmatively state that the new
advances would be governed in any way materially different from the terms of the December
1992 Agreement. In any event, unilateral recitations hardly constitute binding negotiated
contracts. See, e.g., Fubar. Inc. v. Turner. 944 S.W.2d 64, 67 (Texas Ct. App. 1997) ("A
unilateral declaration in a letter does not alter the binding terms of the original contract").
Citing the statute of frauds, the Harringtons also argue that "oral agreements may not
be used to enforce monetary obligations against real property." (Brief of Appellees at 19.)
"It is well settled," intones the Harrington Brief, "that the statute of frauds requires that 'an
agreement to secure an obligation with real property' must be in writing." (Id at 20 (quoting
Hector. Inc. v. United States Sav. & Loan Ass'n. 741 P.2d 542, 546 (Utah 1987).) It is,
however, equally well settled thatff [w]hen an oral contract otherwise prohibited by the statute
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of frauds [including a transaction for the sale of realty] becomes enforceable because of part
performance or otherwise, 'the Statute does not prevent enforcement of the remaining
promises."' Holt v. Katsanevas. 854 P.2d 575, 580 (Ct. App. 1993) (quoting Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 147(2) (1979)). Here, Mrs. Peterson advanced $70,076.44 to the
Harringtons based on Mr. Harrington's assurances that the additional funds advanced would
be governed by the December 1992 Agreement; indeed, had she believed that the 1993
advance was not to be secured by the Sunset Oaks property, "[she] would not have agreed
to make those new advances

" (Record at 831, f 23.) Mrs. Peterson has fully performed

her obligations under this agreement; the Harringtons may not now seek spurious shelter
behind the statute of frauds after coaxing more than $70,000.00 out of Mrs. Peterson through
verbal assurances consistent with earlier written undertakings.
D.

The 1993 Advances were Secured Under Clauses 1, 2, and 4 of the Peterson Trust
Deed's Dragnet Provision.
The Harringtons adduce two arguments in support of their conclusion that "Clauses

(1), (2), and (4) of the [Peterson Trust Deed] do not apply to the 1993 advances made by Mrs.
Peterson. First," assert the Harringtons, "applying any of those clauses necessarily reads
clause (3) out of the agreement. Second, by their own terms, clauses (1), (2) and (4) have no
application here." (Brief of Appellees at 14.)
/.

Application of Clause 1, 2, or 4 has no effect on Clause 3.

The Harringtons' argument that application of clause 1, 2, or 4 negates clause 3 is
based entirely on the acceptance of their question-begging premise that application of these
clauses "conflicts with clause (3)'s specific and express applicability to 'additional loans or
14

advances hereafter made.'" (Brief of Appellees at 14.) The Harringtons, in other words, ask
the Court to assume that clause 3 governs the 1993 advances as part of their argument to
prove that only Clause 3 governs the 1993 advances (rather than clause 1, 2, or 4).
Clauses 1,2, and 4, however, are not fatally inimical to clause 3. Clause 1 secures
future advances made pursuant to a modification of the original loan; clause 2 secures future
advances made pursuant to performance of the agreements in the Trust Deed (subsidizing
repair work, for example); and clause 4 secures future advances "expended or advanced by
Beneficiary under or pursuant to the terms hereof

" (such as paying construction workers

so as to avoid mechanics' liens, to protect the security (see ^f 7)). None of these would in any
way negate or void clause 3; indeed, quite the reverse: under Harringtons' argument, clause
3 nearly eviscerates clauses 1, 2, and 4. A future advance pursuant to a clause 1
modification, clause 2 performance, or a clause 4 expenditure could not be secured under the
Harrington premise because any such advance would be "subsequent and additional to the
original loan" (Brief of Appellees at 14), and thus subject to clause 3 alone.
Such a reading, however, cannot be correct. As the Harringtons themselves point out,
"A contract, such as a trust deed, must be construed so as to harmonize and give effect to all
its provisions." (Brief of Appellees at 14 (citing Nielsen v. O'Reilly. 848 P.2d 664, 665
(Utah 1992) and Minshew v. Chevron Oil Co.. 575 P.2d 192, 194 (Utah 1992).) Plainly, as
Mrs. Peterson has already pointed out, of the universe of possible transactions, the only sort
which necessitates clause 3 (i.e., which is not covered by clause 1, 2, or 4) is the unrelated
future advance; the other three clauses cover everything else.

15

2.

Clauses 1, 2, and 4, by Their Express Terms, are Each Sufficient to Secure
the 1993 Advances.
a.

The 1993 Advances are a Modification of the Original Loan, Secured
by Clause 1.

Clause 1 of the Peterson Trust Deed expressly secures "any extension and/or renewals
or modifications thereof." The Harringtons, however, assert that "[n]o . . . alteration,
adjustment, or change ever occurred to the Peterson Note or [the Peterson Trust Deed]."
(Brief of Appellees at 15.) This, however, is clearly not true. As Mrs. Peterson has already
explained (see supra at p. 5-6), the $70,000.00+ loaned to Mr. Harrington after February
1993 was advanced pursuant to an extension and modification of the agreement made in
December 1992. That Agreement recites the fact that Mr. Harrington executed a Trust Deed
Note for $95,000.00, payable to Mrs. Peterson, on June 21, 1991, secured by the Peterson
Trust Deed; that "[ajdditional funds are needed to complete the construction of the
improvements on the Property"; and that "Peterson is willing to advance additional funds to
be used for that purpose . . . ." (Record at 975, | f A, D, & E.) The moneys advanced by
Mrs. Peterson under the December 1992 Agreement were thus in addition to the $95,000.00
financing she had already provided in June of 1991. This addition constitutes the extension
and/or modification the existence of which the Harringtons deny.
The $75,000.00 advanced under the December 1992 Agreement were expressly
"secured by [the] Trust Deed dated June 21, 1991

" (Record at 977, f 8.) In February

1993, Mr. Harrington again sought a modification, asking Mrs. Peterson for another
"advance [of] additional monies to complete construction" (Record at 419, f 27)—a
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"continuation of] her funding of the final construction that had started in December 1992."
(Id.) The 1993 advance is thus properly seen as an extension or modification of the 1992
agreement secured by the Peterson Trust Deed.
b.

The 1993 Advances Were in Connection With Performance of an
Agreement in the Trust Deed, and Were Thus Secured by Clause 2.

Clause 2 of the Peterson Trust Deed's dragnet provision secures "the performance of
each agreement of Trustor herein contained." Among the various agreements in connection
with the property enumerated in the Peterson Trust Deed is a promise "to complete . . .
promptly and in good and workmanlike manner any building which may be constructed..
. thereon." (Record at 430, f 1.)
Mr. Harrington purchased the Sunset Oaks Property to construct a house for resale,
an activity plainly within the scope of the quoted language, and one for which Mrs. Peterson
thrice provided funding. The Harringtons' brief shies away from its earlier arguments in
favor of "plain language" on this point, however, instead spending two pages (pp. 15-17)
arguing that paragraph 1 of the Peterson Trust Deed does not mean what it says.
The Harringtons argue that paragraph 1 applies only to construction loans because (a)
"[t]he purpose of the provision is . . . T o Protect the Security of this Deed of Trust,'" which,
they declare, "was [not] given . . . to secure a construction loan" (Brief of Appellees at 16),
and (b) later language in paragraph 1 refers to construction loans (id at 16-17).
The Harringtons claim "that the [Peterson Trust Deed] was given to secure a purchase
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of raw land and not to secure a construction l o a n 6 . . . . Plaintiffs therefore could have no
obligation under the trust deed to maintain a structure or complete construction on a structure
that did not exist at the time of purchase." (Brief of Appellees at 16.) The Harringtons'
syllogism, however, breaks down in light of paragraph 1 of the Peterson Trust Deed, which
required Mr. Harrington to "complete... any building which maybe constructed" (emphasis
added), not "which has already been built or begun." Nor is there any clause nullifying the
requirement if the security consists of a vacant lot; in fact, the reverse would actually be the
case, for a lot with a half-finished building on it might very easily decrease in value, thus
tarnishing the security of the loan. This language has nothing to do with the state of the land
when purchased, but with protecting the value of the land thereafter.
The Harringtons' argument that later language in paragraph 1, concerning construction
loans, somehow controls the earlier requirement (discussed above) is similarly flawed. Quite
aside from the fact the earlier requirement, by its own terms, applies whether or not a
building presently sits upon the property, the provision on construction loans at the end of
paragraph 1 is clearly separate from the earlier clause:
if the loan secured hereby . . . is being obtained for the purpose of financing
construction of improvements on said property Trustor further agrees:
(a)
To commence construction promptly and to pursue same with
reasonable diligence to completion . . . , and
(b)
To allow Beneficiary to inspect said property at all times during
construction.

6

This, of course, is totally untrue: Mrs. Peterson disputes the Harringtons' repeated
assertions that there was no connection between her $95,000.00 seller financing and the
construction of the house on the Sunset Oaks Property (See §§ I, II.A.2, and III.A.2.a & b,
supra).
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(Record at 430,1f 1 (emphasis added).) It must be noted that the provision specifies that
these agreements are "further" than the agreements previously enumerated in the paragraph.
The construction loan contemplated here is idependent of with the earlier provision
enjoining "completion]... [of] any building which may be constructed." Mrs. Peterson's
1993 advances, therefore, made expressly "for the purpose of construction of the home
located at 1656 S. Sunset Oaks Dr[ive]" (Record at 454) —that is, for "the performance of
[an] agreement of Trustor contained" in the Peterson Trust Deed—are expressly covered by
Clause 2 of the Trust Deed's dragnet provision.
c.

Clause 4 of the Dragnet Provision Secures the 1993 Advances.

Clause 4 of the Peterson Trust Deed dragnet provision secures "the payment of all
sums expended or advanced by Beneficiary under or pursuant to the terms hereof. . . ."
(Record at 430, f 1.) Paragraph 7 of the Peterson Trust Deed provides that "[s]hould Trustor
fail... to do any act as herein provided, then Beneficiary . . . may: Make or do the same in
such manner to such extent as either may deem necessary to protect the security hereof. . .
•" ( l i , t ?•) Admittedly unable to complete the construction of the house as required by his
agreement in paragraph 1 to "complete . . . promptly and in good and workmanlike manner
any building which may be constructed . . . thereon," Mr. Harrington approached Mrs.
Peterson for further funding in December 1992 and in February 1993. Mrs. Peterson agreed,
at his behest, to provide further advances to the extent necessary to complete the house on
the Sunset Oaks Property. (Record at 831, f 24.) The 1993 advances were thus "sums
expended or advanced by Beneficiary under or pursuant to the terms" of paragraph 7, and
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were therefore fully secured by clause 4 of the dragnet clause of the Peterson Trust Deed.
E.

The 1993 Financing is Secured by the 1991 Trust Deed Simply by Virtue of Being
an Extension of the 1992 Agreement
While it is thus demonstrable that clauses 1,2, and 4 of the 1991 Trust Deed's dragnet

provision plainly secure the 1993 advances, it is nevertheless obvious that the 1993 advances
are secured under the 1991 Trust Deed independently. Inasmuch as the 1993 advances were
made pursuant to an extension and modification of the December 1992 Agreement, which
explicitly recites that it is secured by the 1991 Trust Deed (Record at 977, f 8), Mrs.
Peterson's 1993 advances are likewise secured by the 1991 Trust Deed.
III.

INTEREST ACCRUING ON THE PETERSON NOTE AFTER IT FIRST CAME DUE IN MARCH
OF 1992 WAS NOT LATER WAIVED.

A.

Interest Is Not Voided by Integration or Merger.
The Harringtons argue that the "two specific entries [of N/A] on the Peterson note

demonstrate that the parties specifically agreed that interest would not be applicable to the
$95,000 dollar principal balance in the Peterson Note," (Brief of Appellees at 27.) Once
again, the Harringtons seek to bind Mrs. Peterson to actions unilaterally performed by Mr.
Harrington: in this case, his unilateral insertion of "N/A" into the blanks providing for
interest on the form note, which Mrs. Peterson protested the moment she learned of it
(Record at 172, f 12),7 since both Mr. Harrington's written offer and the earnest money

7

The Harringtons' brief, quoting Mrs. Peterson's brief out of context, asserts that
"Defendants do 'not now claim[ ] interest for the time before the Peterson Note came due in
March 1992," disingenuously insinuating that Mrs. Peterson has changed her position on this
point. (Brief of Appellees at 28.) Indeed, in a footnote to this assertion, Harringtons declare
that "Defendants necessarily recognize that the 'N/A' interest term is clear, unambiguous,
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agreement provided for accrual of interest at 10% per annum (Record at 188 & 189).
Seeking to divert attention from this fact, the Harringtons rather obliquely invoke the
doctrines of parol evidence and merger:
the Peterson Note was the "final expression" of the parties' agreement on the
trust deed note, especially as to the "N/A" interest term. The Peterson Note
was executed simultaneously with the Warranty Deed and Deed of Trust,
which merged or integrated any prior contracts for conveyance.
(Brief of Appellees at 28 n.15.) Actually, however, there is no integration clause anywhere
in the Peterson Trust Deed, the Peterson Note, or the Warranty Deed; and in any case, "all
relevant evidence is admissible on the threshold issue of whether [a] writing was adopted by
the parties as an integration of their agreement.... even if the writing clearly states it to be
a complete and final statement of the parties1 agreement." Union Bank v. Swenson,
707 P.2d 663, 665 (Utah 1985).
The Harringtons' merger argument is equally flawed. The merger doctrine applies
only to matters "related directly to title." Embassy Group, Inc. v. Hatch, 865 P.2d 1366,

and not susceptible to any attack." (Id. at 28 n. 15.) Actually, Mrs. Peterson's brief states that
she "questioned the CN/A' over of [sic] the phone from the moment a copy of the Peterson
Note was faxed to her. Since she did not adequately follow that up, she has not now claimed
interest for the time before the Peterson Note came due in March 1992." (Appellants' Brief
at 14.) Mrs. Peterson has not changed her position and reiterates that she does not concede
that Mr. Harrington's unilaterally slipping "n/a" into the blanks dealing with interest on the
form note while she was in Florida renders the "n/a" unassailable. Rather, she contends that
Mr. Harrington acted in bad faith; that the "n/a" is a spurious alteration of the March 1991
agreement; and that the only reason she did not seek the interest which accrued prior to
March 1992 was her assumption that the signed agreement was binding, no matter what
circumstances precipitated its execution. By the time she was made aware that such was not
the case, she had delayed overlong in bringing the claim. This procedural acknowledgment,
however, is hardly makes Mr. Harrington's furtive insertion of "n/a" sacrosanct.
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1372 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (citing Secor v. Knight. 716 R2d 790, 793 (Utah 1986)); accord
Hunt v. Kojac. 666 N.Y.S.2d 330, 332 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) ("Excepted from th[e merger]
rule are provisions which involve a . . . 'collateral undertaking' that is not connected with
title, possession or quantity of land."). Interest rates—especially post-default interest
rates—are too far removed from issues of transfer of ownership, encumbrance, quiet
enjoyment, type of estate, amount of land involved, or any other matter "related directly to
title," to be covered by the merger doctrine.
B.

Interest at 10% Upon the Harrington's March 21, 1992, Default, Nine Months
After Execution of the Peterson Trust Deed, and Nine Months Prior to the
Execution of the December 1992 Agreement, was not Later Excused or Waived
The allotted time for repayment of the $95,000.00 principal under the Peterson Trust

Deed ran on March 21,1992, nine months from the execution of the Trust Deed, as provided
therein. (See Record at 428.) As part of the December 1992 Agreement, Mrs. Peterson gave
the Harringtons extra time, until the date the Sunset Oaks property was sold, to repay the
original $95,000.00 principal ("the sum owed by Harrington under the terms of the original
Trust Deed Note" (Record at 450, f 4)), as well as the advances for which the December
1992 Agreement provided. The Harringtons apparently believe that Mrs. Peterson's leniency
toward them as to the date of payment somehow deprives her of the right to claim the interest
on a debt already nine months in arrears. (Brief of Appellees at 30.)
The Harringtons assert that the "first sentence of paragraph 4 [of the December 1992
Agreement] . . . . clearly and unambiguously extends the 'due date' for the Peterson Note to
the date of closing . . ." (Brief of Appellees at 30), and thus that "interest on that note was
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'not applicable' until the due date of the sale of the Sunset Oaks Property, i.e., February 24,
1994" (id). They declare moreover, incorrectly, that "the December 8 Agreement... omits
any reference to interest on the $95,000.00 Peterson Note." (Id)
The Harringtons forget that the Peterson Note clearly and unambiguously provides for
accrual of interest, and that Mr. Harrington inscribed no "N/A" in the blanks provided in the
paragraphs dealing with post-default interest, thereby acquiescing to its accrual. Interest thus
began to accrue at the statutory rate of 10% per annum from the Harringtons' default in
March of 1992.8
That paragraph 4 of the December 1992 Agreement, unlike paragraph 3, makes no
mention of the interest accruing on the $95,000.00, only means that this still-accruing interest
is not subject to the same restrictions on repayment as the other items addressed there.
Interest had been accruing on the $95,000.00 financing for nine months already. That
mention of the interest on the earlier sum was not made in one section of the December 1992
Agreement, far from proving none was intended, as Harringtons contend (Brief of Appellees
at 30), actually proves that no modification was either intended or made to the provisions of
the Peterson Note mandating the accrual of interest upon default. Interest thus continued to
run until the present. Mrs. Peterson's agreement to collect the principal of the $95,000.00
financing only from the property or its sale proceeds did not in any way alter the accrual of
interest thereon, nor the sources from which it may be collected.

Accrued interest on the $95,000.00 financing is now close to $60,000.00.
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IV.

MRS. PETERSON SHOULD BE AWARDED HER ATTORNEYS9 FEES.

Mrs. Peterson is entitled to her attorneys' fees under paragraph 19 of the Peterson
Trust Deed: "[u]pon . . . any default... Beneficiary shall be entitled to recover . . . all costs
and expenses . . . including a reasonable attorney's fee" (Record at 966); and paragraph 6 of
the December 1992 Agreement: "Peterson shall be entitled to recover all costs incurred by
her in enforcing the terms hereof, including reasonable attorney fees

" (Record at 977.)

CONCLUSION
It is undisputed that Mr. Harrington thrice approached Mrs. Peterson for financing and
additional loans, totaling in principal alone nearly a quarter of a million dollars
($239,626.84). It is undisputed that Mrs. Peterson advanced these sums, and that Mr.
Harrington received and spent them. Mrs. Peterson, responding in good faith to Mr.
Harrington's importunate wheedling—backed by Harrington's promises, loaned him this
sizable amount expecting timely and proper repayment with interest. Mr. Harrington,
however, while coaxing this small fortune out of Mrs. Peterson, without Mrs. Peterson's
knowledge, raised the amount of the construction loan to which Mrs. Peterson had agreed
temporarily to subordinate her own claim, declared bankruptcy without including Mrs.
Peterson on the list of creditors (indeed, only reluctantly acknowledging it several months
later), and then sought to transform his obligation to repay the 1993 advances to one that is
unsecured and to have her money free and clear of any interest payment whatsoever.
Mrs. Peterson seeks only to recoup the monies and interest still owing to her—an
amount approaching $160,000.00—and the law as set forth herein and in Mrs. Peterson's
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main brief amply supports the proper result, under both law and equity, that Mrs. Peterson
should recover what is rightfully hers.
Despite the apparent complexity of the arguments set forth in the briefs, Mrs.
Peterson's position is actually quite straightforward. She seeks the Court's determination of
two purely legal issues: whether the 1993 advances were, as she maintains, secured by the
1991 Peterson Trust Deed, and whether interest at the statutorily mandated 10% began to
accrue on the Peterson Note from March of 1992 onward. These issues can be resolved by
this Court as questions of law. The Harringtons' position, on the other hand, requires the
Court to determine whether Mr. Harrington's unilateral February 18,1993, letter constitutes
an integration of the agreement between the parties, whether they intended interest to run
from the time of default, and whether the parties intended future advances to be secured
under the 1991 Trust Deed. All of these questions focus on facts which are quite obviously
in dispute (and which preclude summary judgment in favor of the Harringtons).
For these reasons, Defendants respectfully request that the Court reverse the decision
below, granting summary judgment to Defendants, or alternatively to vacate the decision
below, and remand the case for trial.
DATED this

day of April, 1998.
NIELSEN & SENIOR

Harold C.Vertlaaren
John K. Mangum
Scott M. Ellsworth
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